Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

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No.

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In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1997 Term

BARBARA F. GREEN, and

STANLEY R. GREEN,

Petitioners,

-vs-

TOWN OF BROOKLINE,

Respondant.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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33 pp

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals Judgment affirming the United States District Court's Dismissal of the Petitioner's Common Law actions "arising out of and during the course of " a Workmen's Compensation claim and final decision of the Industrial Accident Board was properly granted if the common law actions are not barred by the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152, § 24, and the statute of limitations acts a tool to void the Legislature's intent and enactment of the exclusivity clause within c. 152.

LIST OF PARTIES

The names of all parties to the proceeding in the Court of appeals whose judgment is sought to be reviewed here appear in the caption of the case.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Question Presented	i, 1
List of Parties	ii
Table of Contents	iii-VII
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Workmen's Compensation Provisions Involved	2,3,4
Statement of the Case	5
Reason For Granting the Writ	8

The Judgment and Order of the United States Court of Appeals affirming the United States District Court's Order of Dismissal of thePetitioners common law actions was improperly granted because the Statute of Limitations is outside the obvious intent of the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152, and acts as a tool to void the Legislature's intent and enactment of the exclusivity clause with in G.L. c. 152.

Conclusion	16
Affidavit of Service	19
Appendix I	20, 23
Appendix II	24

CASES

Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 183(111932)	13
Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18 n.4(1979)	11

Albanese's Case,
supra at 14, 15..... 11

Amherst-Pelham Regional School Comm. v
Department of Education,
305 Mass. 480,
492(1978)..... 11

Caswell's Case
305 Mass. 500,
502(1940)..... 10

Fay v Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
9 L.Ed 837, 83 S. Ct.
822(1963)..... 14

Fitzgibbon's Case,
374 Mass. 633,
638(1978)..... 11

Foley v Polaroid Corp.,
381 Mass. 545,
550(1981)..... 11, ~~25-29~~

Gates v Life of Montana Insurance Co.,
668 P. 2d 213, 216, No. 82-
468(11983)..... 5

Gambrell v Kansas City Chief's Football Club, Inc.,
562 S.W. 2d 163, 168(Mo App.
1978)..... 13,14

Harvey's Case,
395 Mass. 300 (1936)..... 10

Korsun's Case,
354 Mass. 124,
125(1968)..... 11

Madden's Case,
222 Mass. 487,
492(1916)..... 9, 13

Mahoney's Case,
337 Mass. 629,632(1958).....

Mays v Williamsons & sons, Inc.,
84-2418, U.S. Ct. App. 8th Cir.,
1985..... 6

McChristal v Clisbee,
190 Mass.
120(1906)..... 12

People v Weinsstein,
213 N.E. 2d 115, I11. App.
1965..... 6

Riddle v Macfadden,
210 N.Y. 215
(1911)..... 12

Thompson v Judy,
95 C.C. A. 51,
54(1982)..... 12

Zerofski's Case,
385 Mass. 590,
592(1982)..... 10

Zygmuntwoicz v American Steel & Wire, Co.
240 Mass 421(1922).....9, 13

STATUTES, RULES, REGULATIONS

Supreme Court Rule 10
(a)..... 1

Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 12(b)
(1,6)..... 2

16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§258..... 1

M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 24.....1, 2, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18

M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 26.....1, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17

M.G.L.A. §§ 23, 24, 26,
28..... 3

M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 1 et
seq..... 3

M.G.L.A. c. 151B § 4,
9..... 3

M.G.L.A. c. 152 §§ 15, 23,
24..... 3

M.G.L.A. c. 152 §
15..... 3

M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 24,St. 1955, c. 174, §
5.....9, 16

W. Prossers, Torts, § 119, at 834 (1976 & Supp.
1979)..... 10, 14

Larson, supra, at §
68.31..... 10

2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation
(§ 68, 33 1976 & Supp.
1979).....12, 13, 15

L. Locke, Workmen's Compensation §651,at 763(1968) (1968). 17

9 Prosser-Torts, §119, at 834
(4th ed. 1971)..... 9

Disciplinary rules DR 7-102, DR 7-
105..... 9

Winsmore v Greenback, Wills Rep.
577(1745)..... 4

452 CMR 1.18(2)..... 7

M.G.L.A. c/o, 10, §10.4, §7.16..... 7

OPINION BELOW

A copy of the Judgment and Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, No. 96-2300, entered on April 17, 1997, is attached and hereinafter referred to as Appendix I.

JURISDICTION

On April 17, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the first circuit, in case no. 96-2300, affirmed the United States District Court's Order of dismissal of the petitioner's common law actions, not barred by M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 24, as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Petitioners submit that 16 C.J.S. constitutional Law § 258 p. 1252, confers jurisdiction on this court. Jurisdiction is further based on Rule 10 (a), Supreme Court Rules, because the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:

> " . . . has decided an important question in conflict with decisions by a state court of last resort and decisions of this court."

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of appeals Judgment affirming the United States District Court's Dismissal of the Petitioner's Common Law actions "arising out of and during the courses of" a Workmen's Compensation claim and final decision of the Industrial Accident

Board was properly granted if the common law actions are not barred by the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152, § 24, and the statute of limitations act as a tool to void the Legislature's intent and enactment of the exclusivity clause within c. 152.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Worker's Compensation - - 1939.11(7)

Industrial Accident Board conclusion as to compensability of injury is not to be reversed unless a different conclusion is required by law.

Worker's Compensation -- 606

A disability arises out of and in the course of employment if it is attributable to the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of employment.

Appeal and error -- 236 (2)

Method for testing the sufficiency of a complaint is by motion to dismiss in superior court for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and where no motion was filed, Supreme Judicial court would consider only whether motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter was properly granted. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 (b) (1,6).

Worker's Compensation -- 2084

Common-law actions are barred by workmen's compensation statute only where plaintiff is shown to be an employee, where his condition is shown to be personal injury within menaing of compensation act, and where injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. M.G.L.A. c. 152 §§ 23, 24, 26.

Worker's Compensation -- 2093

Employee's claim for intentional infliction of mental distress where emotional distress arose out of employment, was within workmen's compensation statute even though such emotional distress allegedly resulted from employer's willful misconduct. M.G.L.A. c. 152 §§ 23,24,26,28.

Worker's Compensation –520, 803

Unlike damages in torts, workmen's compensation is by way of relief from inability to earn, or for deprivation of support flowing from wages theretofore received by employee, and defamations, being injury to reputation, irrespective of any physical or mental harm, was not type of personal injury contemplated by Workmen's Compensation Act. M.G.L.A. c. 152 § 1 et seq.

Malicious Prosecution –14

Any physical or mental harm is incidental to malicious prosecution, and is not indispensable ingredient of the tort.

Worker's Compensation – 2090

Key to whether workmen's Compensation Act precludes common-law right of action lies in nature of injury for which plaintiff makes claim, not nature of act which plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for injury. M.G.L.A. c. 152, §§ 1 et seq. 15,23.

Worker's Compensation – 502, 608

Workmen's Compensation Act protects employee only to extent that his injury arises out of nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of employment, and alleged violation of employee's civil rights is not personal injury arising out of and in course of employment which would be compensable under the Act. M.G.L.A. c. 151B, §§ 4, 9,c. 152, §§ 23,26.

Worker's Compensation -- 2144

Workmen's Compensation does not bar spouse's claim for loss consortium, alienation of affection and society, Winsmore v Greenback, Wills Rep. 577, 1745.

Statement of the Case

On December 10, 1986, the petitioner, Barbara f. Green, "employee", was demanded to sign a pre-written letter of resignation by her employer, Town of Brookline. The employee refused and was immediately suspended pending termination proceedings.

On January 27, 1987, the employee was terminated from her employment as the result of a **retaliation generated termination.** The employee made a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission, case no. D-2847, DALA # CS-87-555. On October 16, 1987, the Civil Service Commission entered a decision affirming the termination of the employee. The employee made a timely judicial review of the Civil Service Commission decision in the Dedham District Court, Dedham, Ma., case no. 23869.

February 1988, the employee made application to the Town of Brookline for refund of her entitled retirement funds. On March 8, 1988, Cathleen Cavell, former Associate Town Counsel, held that, if Mrs. Green were to voluntarily dismiss her state court lawsuits, she would then release the retirement funds. By obtaining that voluntary dismissal, the Town of Brookline and Civil Service Commission were insulating themselves form a claim of **retaliation generated termination.** Gates v Life of Montana Insurance Co., 69 P. 2d 213, 216, No. 82-468 (1983)

June 1988 the employee voluntarily dismissed her lawsuits through her attorney John Silvia, Jr., Fall River, Ma. November 27, 1988, the employee filed a Workmen's Compensation claim for (1)

DeQuervanes disease of the right wrist and (2) the employer intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her in an attempt to force her to resign after she discovered improper actions on the part of her employer.

July 1990, David Turner, Town Counsel, telephoned the employee's attorney, William Long, Fall River, Ma., and stated, he had found "notes" in his associate's (Cathleen Cavell) files and if the workmen's compensation case goes to trial, he would introduce them.

Mr. Turner, was asked, if, these "alleged notes" had been introduced at the Termination or Civil Service hearings. Mr. Turner replied, **No, did not want to upset the husband.** A pretext to gain an advantage in a civil matter. Violations of Dr 7-102 and DR 7-105. See . . Mays v Williamsons & Sons, 84-2418, U.S. App 8th Cir., 1985.

A failure to assert key facts when it would be natural to assert them amounts to a positive assertion of the non-existence of the facts. People v Weinstein, 213 N.E. 2d 115, I11. App.1965.

October 1990, Romm A.J., denied the employee's G.L. c. 152 claim and the employee made a timely appeal. Thereafter, there became a communication break-down between the Greens and Mr. Long, evidenced by Mr. Long's withdrawal from this case in January 1991.

February 1991, the Green's retained Jonathan Levin, Attorney, Boston, who appeared at conference on or about March 14, 1991, to obtain the employee's records for his review. Upon leaving

Conference, Sarah Wilson, former Associate Town Counsel, handed Mr. Levin the "alleged notes" and stated, if this case goes to trial I will introduce these with a witness to testify to them. Thereafter, Mr. Levin declined to take this case.

March 30, 1991, the employee's spouse filed Motion for Order for Compensation Payments. April 5, 1991, the employer filed Opposition to the Motion stating, the employee appealed the denial of her G.L. c. 152 claim. All other causes of action and claims set forth in her motion are not within the jurisdiction of the Department.

And ruling on the Motion for Order was deferred pending all evidence in this case had been entered.

Thereafter, the employee's spouse was authorized to act as Legal Representative (452 CMR 1.18 (2) and filed a Motion for the Production of the employer's psychiatrist's records, files, notes, and otherwise. Upon receipt of the records it was found, that, Cathleen Cavell, former Associate Town Counsel, had presented Stephen Heisel, M.D. with the "alleged notes together with a witness to testify to them to influence Stephen Heisel's examination and report against the employee.

The Administrative Judge appointed an impartial physician from the roster established by new section c. 10, § 10.4, § 7.16. An Administrative Judge may appoint an impartial physician from this panel to examine the employee and report, and the findings will be prim facie evidence. And the impartial physician found casual connection with the employment of the employee and her mental disability.

This case then proceeded to trial on January 5, 1993,February 9, 1993, April 5, 1993, April 6, 1993, May 10, 1993, May 12, 1993 and July 7, 1993, with the decision being entered April 8, 1996. And it was determined as a matter of fact, that, the employee suffered a mental disability as a result of a series of stressful events within the workplace and incidents that were not a bona fide personnel actions.

It is submitted, that, the employee's mental disability was intentionally inflicted by the inaction's of the Civil Service Commission and Officials of the Town of Brookline knowingly permitting individuals to resort to acts of doing justice to themselves knowing they could not obtain justice by any other means and for the sole purpose to justify themselves with the termination of the employee. In other words, the employee was a victim of a **retaliation generated termination.**

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The judgment and Order of the United States Court of Appeals affirming the United States District Court's Dismissal of the Petitioner's Common Law Actions was Improperly Granted because the Statute of Limitations is Outside the Obvious Intent of there Exclusiveness Clause of M.G.L.A. c. 152 and the Statute of Limitations Can Not Be Used To Void the Legislature's Intent and Enactment of the Exclusivity Clause Within M.G.L.A. c. 152.,

1. On April 8, 1996 the Industrial Accident Board found that the employee developed a mental disability as a result of a series of stressful events in the workplace and incidents that were not bona fide personnel actions. Thereafter the Petitioners brought common-

law actions before the United States District Court to recover damages for injuries not compensable under G.L. c. 152 § 26, and common law actions for such injuries, therefore were not barred by the exclusivity provision of G.L. c. 152, § 24.

2. Retaliation generated termination's are those resorted to by employers, employment agencies and labor unions doing justice to themselves knowing they can not obtain justice by any other means and by the adoption of forcible measures and most generally the end result being termination of the employee.

3. To be the basis of a charge of retaliation generated termination, the actions must contain three essential elements: (1) individual liability,[1] (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) constructive discharge.

4. The Petitioners challenge the lawfulness of the Statute of Limitations to bar common law actions for claims not compensable under G.L. c. 152, § 26, and common law actions for such claims, therefore, are not barred by the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152 § 24, as being outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause and can not be used as a tool to void the Legislature's intent and enactment of the exclusivity clause into Workmen's Compensation Act. G.L. c. 152.

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[1] **Defamation, Fraud, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Coercion, Invasion of the Right to Privacy, Loss of Consortium, Alienation of Affection and society of Husband and wife, Seduction, assault, False arrest and Kindred tortious acts. Madden's case Supra at 492. Cf. Zygmuntowicz v American Steel and Wire Co., 240 Mass. 421 (1922).**

5. The defendant's motion to dismiss was properly granted, if, the statute of limitation is inside the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152, and the petitioner's claims are compensble under G. L. c. 152, §26. M.G.L.A. c. 152, § 24, as amended through St. 1955, c. 174, § 5.

6. The method for testing the sufficiency of the complaint is by way of motion to dismiss for failure to settle a claim for which relief can be granted or by motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. **No such motions were filed below.**

7. The respondents argue that the petitioner's common-law actions for damages not compensable under G.L. c. 152, § 26, and arising out of and during the course of a Workmen's Compensation claim are barred by the statute of limitations.

8. First, the petitioner's complaint and record must show that at the time their injuries were sustained by virtue of the defendant's conduct, the employee must be found to be an employee before compensation may be had under the Act. (Harvey' Case, 395 Mass. 300 (1936). And the Administrative record is clear, the employee was an employee at all times.

9. The controlling argument must be that the essence of the tort is not physical or mental injury, but interference with the right to be free from injuries to character or reputation. W. Prosser, Torts, §119, at 834 (4th ed. 1971), any physical or mental harm is incidental, and is not an indispensable ingredient of the tort. See Larson, supra at §68.31.

10. An employee is entitled to compensation under G.L. c. 152, §26, where his or her injury-whether physical or emotional -arose

"out of and in course of " employment. Zerofski's Case 385 Mass. 590, 592 (1982), quoting Caswell's Case, 500, 502,(1940). The responsibility for separating injuries that are work-related from those that are not rests with the Industrial Accident Board which must determine as a matter of fact whether causal connection exists between employment and injury. Zeroski's Case, supra at 594. See Mahoney's Case, 337 Mass. 629, 632 (1958). A decision upon the question of causation was.. within province of the Board to determine. On judicial review the findings of the reviewing Board must be accepted as final unless they are wholly lacking in evidential support or tainted by error or law. Korsun's Case, 354 Mass. 124, 125(1968), and cases cited. and particular deference is given to the agency's interpretation of its governing statute where "the statute itself vests broad powers in the agency to fill in the details of the legislative scheme. Amherst Pelham Regional School Comm. v Department of Educ., 376 Mass. 480, 492(1978.)

11. Where employees have received compensation for mental or emotional disorders caused by work related trauma the courts relied on the findings by the Board that the injury resulted from a "single traumatic event... a stress greater than the ordinary stresses of everyday work or a series of "stressful work-related incidents. "Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 18 n.4(1979). See Foley v Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 550(1981)

12. With respect to the claim for intentional infliction of mental distress, the employee recognizes that emotional distress arising out of employment was/is a personal injury under the Act If an employee

is incapacity by mental or emotional disorder causally related to a series of stressful work-related incidents the employee is entitled to compensation. Albanese's Case, supra at 14-15. Fitzgibbon's Case,374 Mass. 633 (1978). Therefore, common-law actions for such claim are barred by the exclusivity provision of G.L. c. 152, §24.

13. Now looking at the employee's individual liability claims against the employer to determine whether they are compensable under the Act. I has been long recognized that the general term "personal Injury" encompasses wrongs which would not be personal injuries under the workmen's Compensation Act. Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487, 492(1916); Madden's Case cites the following examples of personal injuries which would not be compensable under the Act: "injuries to reputation resulting from libel, Thompson v Judy, 95 C.C.A. 51, 54(1909); malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, McChristal v Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120(1906); invasion of the right to privacy, Riddle v MacFadden, 210 N.Y. 215(1911); as well as the alienation of affection of husband and wife, seduction, false arrest and kindred tortuous acts. Madden's Case, supra at 491. CF. Zygmuntowicz vAmerican Steel & Wire Co., 240 Mass. 421(1922).

14. The employee's claim for injuries to reputation are not the type of personal injuries contemplated by G. L. c. 152. In so concluding, the lack of relationship between the kind of injuries covered by the act and the injuries involved here. The Act has been interpreted to encompass physical and mental injuries arising out of

employment,, where the gist of an action for individual liability is injury to reputation, irrespective of any physical or mental harm.

15. Citing the statute of limitations to block the main thrust of this action because of peripheral items of damages, when the compensation claim could not purport to give relief for the main wrong of the injury to reputation, would be incongruous, and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause. See 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation §68.33(1976 & Supp. 1979). Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 183 (1932); Ferriter v Daniel O'Connelll's Sons, supra L. Locke, Workmen's Compensation §9, at 11(1968),; G.L. c. 152, §23. Cf. G.L. c. 152, §15.

16. At this point the distinction between the employee's claims for individual liability and constructive discharge on the one hand, intentional infliction of mental distress on the other hand, becomes clear: mental harm is the essence of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress; it is an indispensable element of the tort. I matters not that all claims are based upon the same alleged conduct of the employer for "the key to whether Workmen's Compensation Act precludes common-law rights of action lies in the nature of the defendant's act which the petitioners allege to have been responsible for the injuries. Gambrell v Kansas City Chief's Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W. 2d. 163, 168 (Mo App. 1978).

17. With respect to the employee's claim her civil rights were violated. Constructive discharge occurs when employers, employment agencies and labor unions permits conditions of discrimination and permit individuals to resort to acts to do justice to

themselves knowing they can not obtain it by any other means and by the adoption of forcible measures. Constructive discharge is injury to reputation and the positive intent to injure or annoy another person and deprive a person of his rights, irrespective of any physical or mental harm, therefore, the employee's civil rights claim is not the type of injury contemplated by G.L. c. 152, and is not compensable under G.L. c. 152, §26, and the employee's common law action for such injuries are, therefore, not barred by the exclusivity provision of G.L. c. 152 §24. And constructive discharge is a Title Seven violation with federal district courts holding original jurisdiction, thereof.

18. With respect to the employee's claim against her employer's Counsels for coercion, The U.S. Court of Appeals decision, P. 3., para. 2, is in conflict with the decision of this court in the area of coercion. Petitioners Brief p. 22, para 23, para 95, 96. Fay v Noia, U. S. 391, 9 L. Ed 837, 83 S. Ct. 822 (1963). Reck v Pate. Coercion is a positive intent to deprive a person of his freedom of will and unconstitutionally allow society to the use of a decision that may be untrue, irrespective of any physical or mental harm. And the employee's complaint against her employer's Counsels use of created evidence to gain advantages in civil matters falls within this area of coercion.

19. The controlling argument must be the essence of the tort is not physical or mental injury but interference with a persons freedom of will and the use of society to a decision that may be untrue. W. Prosser, Torts, §119, at 834 (1976 & supp. 1979). Any p physical or mental harm is incidental, and is not an indispensable ingredient of

the tort. see Larson, supra at § 68.31. At this point the distinction between the employee's claims against her employer for coercion and using created evidence to gain advantages in civil matters on the one hand, intentional infliction of mental distress on the other hand, becomes clear: mental harm is the essence of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress; it is an indispensable element of the tort. Gambrell v Kansas City Chief's Football Club, Inc., 562 S. W. 2d 163, 186 (Mo. App. 1978).

20. It is submitted, that, the petitioner's common-law actions against the employer for damages not contemplated as personal injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act and not compensable under G.L. c. 152, §26, did not accrue until on April 8, 1996, the date the Industrial Accident Board determined as a matter of fact, that casual connection existed between employment and the employee's mental disability, resulting form a series of stressful events within the workplace and incidents that were not bona fide personnel actions.

21. Not withstanding, the use of the statute of limitations to block the main thrust of these acclaims and actions, arising out o f and during the course of a Workmen's Compensation claim for intentional infliction of mental distress, because of peripheral damages, would be incongruous, and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause of M. G.L. A. c. 152, §24. See 2A A. Larson Workmen's Compensation §68.33 (1976 & Supp. 1979). And the statute of limitations would act as a tool to void the Legislature's intent and enactment of the exclusivity provisions of G.L. c. 152.

22. The statute of limitations may afford blockage of common law actions on direct review of a termination proceeding filed after the three year limit, but this must be free from any Workmen's Compensation claim. Under Workmen's Compensation claims related to stress, a person may suffer a heart condition after five years from the date of injury, among other causes.

23. The responsibility for separating injuries that are sufficiently work-related from those that are not rests with the Industrial Accident Board, which must determine as a matter o fact whether causal connection exists between employment and the injury. Therefore, no common law actions may be maintained against an employer until or after the Industrial Accident Board has determined as a matter of fact the employee's mental disability as a result of a series of stressful events within the workplace and incidents that were not bona fide personnel actions.

CONCLUSION

24. The Appellee's motion to dismiss the Petitioner's common law actions in the District Court, as time barred, can only be properly granted and affirmed if the Petitioner's actions are on direct review and appeal to the Termination proceedings dated January 27, 1987, and Civil Service Commission proceedings dated October 16, 1987.

25. **This is not the case here today. This action arises out of and during the course of a Workmen's Compensation claim.**

26. Workmen's Compensation Act, G.L. c . 152, §24, as amended through St. 1955, c. 174, §5, states in pertinent part: "An employee shall be held to have waived his right of action at common

law or under the law of any other jurisdiction in respect to an injury therein occurring, to recover damages for personal injuries if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract oh hire, written notice that he claimed such right. . ." Barbara Green does not assert that she gave the Respondent notice of her rights under the compensation act, but rather that his injury is not covered under the act. Common law actions are barred only where the plaintiff is shown to be an employee: his condition is shown to be a "personal injury" within the meaning of the compensation act; and the injury is shown to have arisen "out of and in the course of . . .employment" G.L. c. 152, §26. L. Lock, Workmen's Compensation §651, at 763 (1968).

27. The Court of Appeals and District Court have each errored, on that part, that: the petitioner's claims against the Appellee for **retaliation generated termination** "arose out of and in the course of " an appeal on the October 1990, decision of Romm, A.J., that denied the employee's G.L. c. 152 claim and a decision of the Industrial Accident Board entered April 8, 1996, which determined as a matter of fact there was causal connection between the employee's employment and mental disability. That the employee suffered a mental disability as a result of a series of stressful events in the workplace and incidents that were not bona fide personnel actions.

28. The Court of Appeals and the District Court have each errored on that part, that:

Retaliation generated termination's must contain three essential elements:

(1) individual liability, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) constructive discharge.

29. The employee's claim against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore is compensable under G.L. c. 152, §24.

30. The petitioner's claims for individual liability and constructive discharge are not personal injuries within the meaning of the workmen's Compensation Act and are not compensable under G.L. c. 152, §26, and the petitioner's common law actions for such claims are, therefore, not barred by the exclusivity clause of G. L. c. 152, §24. And the statute of limitations can not be used as a tool to void the Legislative intent and enactment of the exclusivity provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, G.L. c. 152.

31. Therefore, the Appellee's motion to dismiss in the District Court, affirmed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit were improperly granted and deprived the petitioner's of their common law rights to sue the employer for claims that accrued "out of and in the course of" a Workmen's Compensation claim for **intentional infliction of emotional distress**, and whose rights are not barred by the exclusivity clause of G.L. c. 152, §24.

32. For the foregoing reasons and conditions, the petitioners respectfully urge this Honorable Court to grant their petitioner and issue a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and thereafter reverse the Order of Dismissal in the

District Court and the petitioner's be entitled to pursue their common law actions and claims accrued under G.L. c. 152.

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No.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1997 Term

BARBARA F. GREEN, and

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Petitioners,

-vs-

TOWN OF BROOKLINE,

Respondant.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

We, Barbara F. Green & Stanley R. Green, petitioners in the foregoing petition hereby certify we have this ~~20th~~ 28 day of ~~June~~ July 1997, served two copies of the foregoing petition upon Joslin Ham Murphy, associate Town Counsel, for the Appellee, at 333 Washington Street, Brookline, MA. 02146, by certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid.

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(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 96-2300

BARBARA F. GREEN AND STANLEY R. GREEN,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

TOWN OF BROOKLINE,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge)

Before

Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.

Barbara F. Green and Stanley R. Green on brief pro se.
Joslin Ham Murphy on brief for appellee.

April 17, 1997

Per Curian. Appellants Barbara F. and Stanley R. Green filed a complaint in the Massachusetts district court. The complaint challenges the treatment Mrs. Green received at the hands of her employer, the Town of Brookline, and cites two bases of jurisdiction: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20000e-3 and 2000e-5. The district court dismissed the complaint due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. We affirm.

. We agree with the district court that appellants' § 1983 claims are time-barred. "Local law determines the limitations period for section 1983 claims." Morris v. Government Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F. 3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994). We thus Look to the three-year Massachusetts statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Street v. Vose, 936 F. 2d 38, 39 (1st Cir 1991) (per curium) (citing G.G.L. c. 260, § 2A). When the cause of action accrued, however, is a federal question. Id. at 40. In a case such as this, "the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff learns of the decision to terminate (her) employment . . . . " Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F. 2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1992).

Mrs. Green learned that the Town had decided to terminate her on December 10, 1986. This lawsuit, filed over nine years after this date, plainly is late. The same conclusion results even if we consider the Town's threats to use certain notes in evidence in the workers' compensation case. According to the complaint, these threats were first made in 1990. Because this is about six years prior

to the initiation of the instant action, the complaint also is time-barred in relation to these later charges.

Finally, appellants present no reason to toll the running of the limitations period. Even assuming that the attorney for the Town coerced Mrs. Green into dismissing her court case appealing the decision of the Civil Service Commission, this occurred in 1988. There simply are no factual allegations that the Town or any one acting on its behalf did anything to prevent appellants from filing the present lawsuit. See Pahlave v. Palandjian, 809 F. 2d 938, 942-43 (1st Cir 1987) (in the absence of specific factual allegations, a plaintiff cannot claim that duress tolls the statute of limitations).

2. Title VII has two deadlines which are in issue in this case. First, an individual in a state such as Massachusetts - - a "deferral" state with its own civil rights law and agency -- must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days after the "alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e). See also Lawton v State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 101 F 3d 218, 221 (1st Cir 1996). Second, the individual must file an action in the district court within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 42 u.s.c. § 2000E-5 (F).

"In actions brought under Title VII . . . a plaintiff must plead affirmatively performance of the conditions precedent to filing a lawsuit." 2AJ. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 9. 04, at 9-65 (2d ed. 1996) (footnote omitted); Jackson v. Seaboard Cost Line R.R. Co., 678 F 2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir 1982). Under fed. R. Civ. P. 9,

which governs the pleading of special matters, "it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 (c)

However, our review of the record reveals that plaintiffs never met their burden of alleging general compliance with Title VII's filing requirements. That is, they never stated their complaint, in their responses to the Town's motion to dismiss, or even in their briefs on appeal, that they filed the federal complaint within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter. Further, the record does not contain any documents from which such inferences can be drawn.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Civil Action
No: 96-11252-WGY

GREEN
Plaintiff

v.

TOWN OF BROOKLINE
Defendant

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

YOUNG, D.J.

After a hearing held on THURS., OCT. 10, 1996, this Court Orders that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is llowed and the above entitled action be and hereby is Dismissed

Robert J. Smith, Jr.
Clerk

By s" _____
Deputy Clerk

October 10, 1996

Notice mailed to counsel of record.